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Weak coherent states as a photon source for quantum cryptography have limit in secure data rate
and transmission distance because of the presence of multi-photon events and loss in transmission
line. Two-photon events in a coherent state can be taken out by a two-photon interference scheme.
We investigate the security issue of utilizing this modified coherent state in quantum cryptography.
A 4 dB improvement in secure data rate or a nearly two-fold increase in transmission distance over
the coherent state are found. With a recently proposed and improved encoding strategy, further
improvement is possible.
PACS numbers: PACS Number: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Dv, 42.50.Ar
I. INTRODUCTION
The ultimate security of quantum cryptography stems
from the non-cloning theorem[1] of quantum mechanics,
which is applied to a single quantum system. In other
words, quantum information can only be shared between
two parties, the one (Alice) who creates it and the one
(Bob) who receives it. Therefore, in the implementa-
tion in optical communication, the ideal source is a sin-
gle photon source with information carried by individual
photons. So far a weak coherent state from a laser is
closest to a single photon source for quantum cryptog-
raphy. The experimental realization[2] of the first pro-
posed quantum cryptography protocol, known as BB84
protocal[3], involved a heavily attenuated thermal source
(which is worse than a laser in the aspect of multi-photon
events). However, the existence of multiple photon events
for a weak coherent state, even though very rare, poses se-
rious problem for the security of the protocol. An eaves-
dropper (Eve) can in principle use the so-called photon
number splitting attack to tap the information without
being noticed. Recent analysis by Lu¨tkenhaus[4] on the
security of quantum cryptography by a weak coherent
state puts limit on the data rate and transmission dis-
tance for secure key distribution.
Significant progress has been made in producing single
photon states[5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. But so far
these sources are fluorescence-based and have small ef-
ficiency. Furthermore, because the emission depends on
energy structure, it has a fixed wavelength and a finite
time response for high repetition rate. So they are lim-
ited for practical applications. Recently a new scheme
was proposed[14] and realized[15] for producing a pho-
ton source with same single photon rate as a coherent
state but less two-photon events. The scheme relies on
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a two-photon quantum interference phenomenon to re-
duce and eventually cancel the two-photon events from
a coherent state. Although it cannot take out all the
multi-photon events, it does take out the most dominat-
ing multi-photon events – two-photon events. This mod-
ified coherent state (MCS) has the advantages of high
data rate, well defined direction and wave-length inde-
pendence for practical application in quantum cryptog-
raphy.
A new quantum cryptography protocol(SARG04) was
recently proposed[16] against the photon number split-
ting attack for weak coherent state. Such a scheme
relies on a smarter encoding scheme that is based on
nonorthogonal states and requires at least two or more
photons for Eve to recover the data. Thus Eve needs at
least three photons to use the photon number splitting
attack. If we use this protocol on the modified coherent
state, we will make a three-photon interference effect to
cancel the three-photon term so that Eve can only rely on
the 4-photon or higher order terms to apply the photon
number splitting attack. So the modified coherent state
still has advantage over a weak coherent state in this new
protocol.
Because of the existence of the multi-photon terms, the
modified coherent state has similar security problems as
the coherent state. But the influence of those higher
order terms will be smaller. The security problem of the
coherent state was investigated by Lu¨tkenhaus [4] and
Brassard et al[17]. In the following, we will apply the
same line of argument of Ref.[4] to look for the optimum
secure data rate and transmission distance for a given
transmission loss and dark counts of the detectors for the
modified coherent state in both BB84 protocol in Ref.[3]
and the new SARG04 protocol in Ref.[16]. To do that, we
need to find the probability Pm for multi-photon event
and the probability Ps to detect any photon in such a
state. We will start in the following with the description
of the modified coherent state.
2II. GENERATION OF THE MODIFIED
COHERENT STATE (MCS)
The modified coherent state is just a coherent state
without the two-photon or three-photon terms. It can
be generated by mixing a coherent state with a two-
photon state from parametric down-conversion. There
are two types of mixing. The first one is to inject the co-
herent state into an optical parametric amplifier with a
small gain. This is the scheme first proposed by Stoler to
produce light source with sub-Poisonian statistics. The
second one mixes the two fields with a beamsplitter. In
practice the first method is more direct and simpler to
implement. In the following calculation, the results are
more or less same. We will consider only the first method.
For simplicity of argument, we will only treat single
mode case here. In reality, this corresponds to, for ex-
ample, a single temporal mode of pulses of light. We will
concentrate on the probabilities of detecting photons in
each pulse. The data rate discussed below will be the
probability per pulse. In CW case, we will consider the
average photon number (= |α|2 for coherent state, see be-
low) rather than the intensity as our parameter. So the
detection time does not appear as a separate parameter
but is included in the average photon number. However,
we do require the detection time be much smaller than
the coherence time of the field to ensure the single mode
approximation.
In an optical parametric amplifier, the interaction
Hamiltonian is given by
Hˆ = jh¯ξ∗aˆ2/2 + h.c., (1)
where ξ is proportional to the amplitude of the pump field
and the nonlinear conversion coefficient of the nonlinear
medium.
With the injection of a coherent state, the initial state
is simply a coherent state |α〉 and the output state be-
comes
|Ψ〉out = Uˆ |α〉 (2)
with
Uˆ = exp 1
2
(ζ∗aˆ2 − ζaˆ†2). (3)
ζ is proportional to ξ. As a matter of fact, the above state
is simply the two-photon coherent state or the squeezed
coherent state first discussed by Yuen[18]. In order to
find the probability of photon number, we expand the
above state in the photon number state base and obtain
from Ref.[18, 19]
|Ψ〉out = Uˆ |α〉 =
∞∑
n=0
Cn|n〉, (4)
with
Cn =
1√
n!µ
( ν
2µ
)n
2
exp
( ν∗
2µ
α2 − |α|
2
2
)
Hn
( α√
2µν
)
, (5)
where Hn is the nth-order Hermite polynomial and
µ ≡ cosh(|ζ|), ν ≡ ζ|ζ| sinh(|ζ|), or µ
2 = 1 + |ν|2.
More specifically to our interest, we list
C0 =
1√
µ
exp(
ν∗
2µ
α2 − 1
2
|α|2),
C1 = C0
α
µ
,
C2 =
C0√
2
[
− ν
µ
+
(α
µ
)2]
,
C3 =
C0√
6
[
− 3να
µ2
+
(α
µ
)3]
,
C4 =
C0√
24
[
3
(ν
µ
)2
− 6να
2
µ3
+
(α
µ
)4]
,
From the above, we easily find the probability for
multi-photon event as
Pm = 1− |C0|2 − |C1|2. (6)
This quantity is minimized when
α2 = µν (7)
with a minimum value of
Pm = 1− 1
µ
(
1 +
|ν|
µ
)
e−(µ−|ν|)|ν|. (8)
Notice that the two-photon probability P2 = |C2|2 is zero
under this condition. This results from a two-photon
interference effect between the coherent state and the
spontaneous parametric down-conversion, i.e., interfer-
ence between the two-photon amplitude µν/
√
2 of para-
metric down-conversion and the two-photon amplitude
α2/
√
2 of a coherent state.
For SARG04 protocol, we need to minimize the prob-
ability for events of three or more photons. This proba-
bility is given by
P ′m = 1− |C0|2 − |C1|2 − |C2|2, (9)
which is minimized when
α2 = 3µν (10)
with a minimum value of
P ′m = 1−
1
µ
(
1 +
|ν|
µ
)(
1 +
2|ν|
µ
)
e−3(µ−|ν|)|ν|. (11)
Similar to the two-photon case, when condition in
Eq.(10) is satisfied, three-photon probability P3 = |C3|2
is zero as a result of three-photon interference. It is not
easy to understand how a three-photon effect can arise
from parametric down-conversion with only even number
of photons. What happens is that a two-photon event
from parametric down conversion combines with a single
photon event in coherent state to form a three-photon
3event with an amplitude of
√
3/2µνα. This amplitude
interferes with another three-photon event directly from
the coherent state with an amplitude of α3/
√
6. Com-
plete cancellation occurs when the two amplitudes are
equal leading to Eq.(10).
To evaluate the photon detection probability Ps, we
notice that in practice, photodetection usually has non-
unit efficiency. This will reduce the signal level. We need
to calculate the photon detection probability under this
non-ideal condition. The non-unit efficiency is modelled
as a beamsplitter of transmissivity η. We may start with
the photon number probability for single mode case as
[19]
Pn =
〈
:
(aˆ′†aˆ′)n
n!
exp(−aˆ′†aˆ′) :
〉
,
where :: denotes normal ordering and aˆ′ =
√
ηaˆ +√
1− ηaˆ0 with aˆ0 in the vacuum. More specifically for
the case of no photon:
P0 = 〈: exp(−aˆ′†aˆ′) :〉.
Then a simple calculation leads to
P0 = 〈: exp(−ηaˆ†aˆ) :〉, (12)
where the average is over the state in Eq.(2). Then the
photon detection probability is simply
Ps = 1− P0. (13)
From the appendix, we have
P0 =
exp
[
− ηx2(µ−|ν|)µ+|ν|(1−η) − ηy
2(µ+|ν|)
µ−|ν|(1−η)
]
√
µ2 − |ν|2(1− η)2 (14)
with x+ iy ≡ αe−iϕ/2 (eiϕ ≡ ν/|ν|).
With the condition in Eq.(7) for minimum multi-
photon events, we have the signal probability
Ps = 1−
exp
[
− ηµ|ν|(µ− |ν|)/(µ+ |ν|(1 − η))
]
√
µ2 − |ν|2(1 − η)2 , (15)
or
P ′s = 1−
exp
[
− 3ηµ|ν|(µ− |ν|)/(µ+ |ν|(1 − η))
]
√
µ2 − |ν|2(1− η)2 (16)
for condition in Eq.(10).
III. OPTIMUM SECURE TRANSMISSION
RATE
Next we evaluate the secure transmission rate based
on the formulism from Ref.[4]. The communication rate
per slot (pulse) for a certain error rate e is given by
R =
Ps
2
[
ρ(1− τ(e)) + f(e)h(e)
]
. (17)
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FIG. 1: Communication rate as a function of (a) |α|2 for BB84
with coherent state, (b) ν for BB84 with modified coherent
state, and (c) ν for SARG04 with modified coherent state.
The overall efficiency is η = - 9.45 dB, which corresponds to
a transmission distance of 5 km in KTH15.
In the above equation, the parameter ρ is given by
ρ =
Ps − Pm
Ps
, (18)
which is the probability of detection events originating
from the desirable photon events. The compression func-
tion τ(e) is given by
τ(e) = log2
[
1 + 4
e
ρ
− 4( e
ρ
)2
]
. (19)
The function h(e) is the Shannon entropy function given
by
h(e) = −e log2 e− (1− e) log2(1− e). (20)
The function f(e) characterizes the performance of the
error correction algorithm.
In order to simulate the communication rate, we need
the values of Ps, Pm, e, and f(e). For BB84 protocol
with the modified coherent state, Pm and Ps are given
in Eqs.(7) and (15), respectively. However, due to the
existence of dark count of any photodetectors, Bob’s de-
tection events can be contributed from a signal that orig-
inates from Alice’s transmission, and a dark count that
originates from Bob’s photodetectors. Therefore, after
taking into account the dark counts of the detectors, the
signal probability Ps has to be modified as
Ps → P¯s = Ps + Pd − PsPd, (21)
where Pd is the dark count distribution and is simply
equal to the dark counts per slot. Similarly, the error
rate is also resulted from the signal and the dark count,
and can be modelled by
e =
cPs + Pd/2
P¯s
, (22)
where c is a constant and characterizes a baseline signal
error rate. Typical system should have a value of c less
4than 2%. The total detection efficiency η can be sep-
arated into the channel transmission and the quantum
efficiency of Bob’s photodetectors. For fiber communica-
tions, the transmission in the quantum channel is given
by
ηc = 10
−(al+L)/10, (23)
where a is the loss coefficient of the fiber channel mea-
sured in dB/km, l is the length of the fiber, and L is the
loss in the receiver Bob’s detection.
We evaluate the communication rate as a function of
the free parameters ν(µ =
√
1 + ν2) for MCS in BB84
and SARG04 or |α|2 for coherent state, using parameters
taken from the case KTH15 in Ref.[4]. The dark counts
per slot is Pd = 2 × 10−4. The baseline signal error
rate is set to be c = 0.01. The loss coefficient a of the
fiber channel is 0.2 dB/km, and the receiver loss is 1 dB.
The quantum efficiency of the photodetectors is ηd =
0.18. The total detection efficiency is then η = ηcηd.
For MCS in BB84, Pm and Ps are given in Eqs.(8) and
(15) while for SARG04 protocol with MCS, Pm and Ps
are from Eqs.(11) and (16), respectively. Fig.1 shows the
communication rates as a function of |α|2 at l = 5 km for
the BB84 protocol with coherent state or as a function of
ν for the modified coherent state in BB84 protocol and
the SARG04 protocol. As can be seen, there is a clear
maximum on the communication rate curve as a function
of the adjustable parameter ν or |α|2.
Next we concentrate on the optimal rate as we vary the
transmission distance l, then obtain the resulting curves
as shown in Fig.2. The overall efficiency η is plotted
in the top axis of Fig.2 for reference. The curve (a) is
a simple repeat of Ref.[4] for a weak coherent state in
BB84. Curves (b) for MCS in BB84 and (c) for MCS in
SARG04 have significant improvement over (a). At zero
transmission distance, we find a 4 dB increase in secure
data rate from modified coherent state over the coherent
state in the BB84. A further 6 dB increase in secure data
rate is resulted from MCS with SARG04 protocol. Note
that each curve features a cutoff transmission distance.
Modified coherent state has nearly two-fold increase in
transmission distance over the coherent state in BB84. A
further nearly two-fold increase in transmission distance
is found with SARG04.
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APPENDIX A: CALCULATION OF EQ.(14)
The average in Eq.(12) is over the state in Eq.(4). To
do this we first convert Eq.(12) in the normal ordering
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FIG. 2: Optimum rate as a function of transmission distance
for: (a) BB84 with coherent state; (b) BB84 with modified
coherent state; (c) SARG04 with modified coherent state.
form into one without normal ordering from Ref.[20]:
P0 = 〈: exp(−ηaˆ†aˆ) :〉 = 〈exp[− ln(1 − η)aˆ†aˆ)]〉. (A1)
Next we convert Eq.(A1) into anti-normal ordering form
from Ref.[20] again:
P0 = e
− ln(1−η)〈A{exp[(1− e−ln(1−η))β∗β]}〉
=
1
1− η 〈α|Uˆ
†A{exp[− η
1− ηβ
∗β]}Uˆ|α〉. (A2)
Then we insert the closure relation:
1
pi
∫
d2β|β〉〈β| = 1 (A3)
between bˆn and bˆ†m in A(β∗mβn) = bˆnbˆ†m in Eq.(A2)
and we have
P0 =
1
pi
∫
d2β
1
1− η exp(−
η
1− η |β|
2) |〈β|Uˆ |α〉|2. (A4)
From Ref.[18, 19] we find
〈 β|Uˆ |α〉
=
1√
µ
exp
[
− |α|
2 + |β|2
2
+
ν∗α2 − νβ∗2 + 2β∗α
2µ
]
.
Substituting the above expression in Eq.(A4) and with
some lengthy manipulation, we arrive at the expression
in Eq.(14).
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